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ANDERSON v. ANDERSON: CREDIT
SENTENCING OR FORFEITED TIME?
Kirk Lehnard
A harsh, but relatively unpublicized problem has long existed
within the American judicial system concerning credit for prison time
served under consecutive sentences. Specifically, does a prisoner have
the right to credit time served under the first of consecutive terms
against remaining terms imposed at the same time, when the first sen-
tence is voided or overruled by an appellate court? The courts have
failed to deal with this problem with any degree of consistency.' As
a consequence prisoners faced with the predicament of years of lost
time under an invalid judgment and sentence often are forced to face
tribunals that will decide their future in unpredictable and often irra-
tional ways.
Recently the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals further con-
tributed to this state of confusion with its decision in Anderson v. An-
derson.2 In Anderson, petitioner had been convicted under four sep-
arate judgments and sentenced to three consecutive sentences, the
first for fifteen years. Petitioner served six years of this first sentence
before it was reversed by the Court of Criminal Appeals.3 Petitioner
sought credit for this time served to be applied to the remaining con-
secutive'sentences for the different crimes. The court denied peti-
tioner's plea holding instead that he was liable for the entire term of
the remaining sentences, despite the six years previously served.
In disposing of this problem the court relied upon two of the
three most common reasons for denying such credit. Citing Oklahoma
authority the court reasoned that time served by the petitioner under
the void sentence would not be credited upon another sentence im-
1. See generally, Agata, Time Served Under A Reversed Sentence or Conviction-
A Proposal and A Basis for Decision, 25 MoNT. L. REV. 3 (1963); Wagner, Sentence
Credit for "Dead Time," 8 CiuM. L. BuLL. 393 (1972).
2. 513 P.2d 345 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
3. Anderson v. State, 510 P.2d 998 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
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posed upon petitioner for an entirely different offense.4 The point
continually stressed by the Oklahoma court and other supporting ju-
risdictions was that the time served only applied to the void sentence,
with the remaining sentences waiting to be served in full.8 For the
luckless prisoner, years previously served become literally lost time.
The lack of a constitutional prohibition against the denial of credit
was also utilized by the court in reaching its decision." This constitu-
tional crutch does lend some strength to the argument against credit
in certain limited situations. As stated by one court in United States
es rel. Watson v. Pennsylvania,7
While we are somewhat sympathetic to relator's situation, we
cannot conceive of a constitutionally inundated system of ac-
cumulated prison credits . . . . Such a requirement of
credit for time served under vacated sentences would en-
able recidivists to obtain release or to avoid incarceration al-
together by the simple device of pleading a prior invalid im-
prisonment.
But as will be further noted this so-called constitutional silence is only
partially applicable -to ,the Anderson case, in that it only conerns that
part of the invalid sentence that was served prior to the imposition
of the second, valid sentence.
The third premise often employed by courts to avoid credit sen-
tencing is -the construction or interpretation of the "jail-time" statutes.
These laws provide the inmate with credit against his sentence for the
time served in confinement prior to actual reception at the peniten-
tiary.8 Under a strict construction of these statutes, it has been deter-
mined that they do not apply to time served under an invalid sen-
tence. 9 Since these statutes do not specifically grant credit in such
a situation they are subsequently employed as a convenient device with
4. Evans v. Page, 465 P.2d 771 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970); Dorrough v. Page,
450 P.2d 520 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969); Ex parte Farve, 64 Oki. Cr. 326, 79 P.2d
1034 (1938).
5. Taylor v. Wainwright, 178 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1965); Montford v. Wainwright,
162 So. 2d 663 (Fla 1964); In re Allen, 140 So. 2d 640 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1962);
State v. Rhoades, 77 N.M. 536, 425 P.2d 47 (1967).
6. United States ex reL Olden v. Rundle, 279 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
United States ex reL Watson v. Penn., 260 F. Supp. 474 (E. D. Pa. 1966). See also
Evans v. Page, 465 P.2d 771 at 773 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970).
7. 260 F. Supp. 474, 475 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
8. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 70.30(3) (1967); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57 § 138 (1971); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 894 (1964).
9. People v. Kowalsky, 2 N.Y.2d 949, 142 N.E.2d 421, 162 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1957);
Nataluk v. Denno, 227 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Evans v. Page, 465 P.2d 771
(Okla. Crim. App. 1970); Dorrough v. Page, 450 P.2d 520 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969).
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which to deny the prisoner credit for time of incarceration.
As explicitly emphasized by Judge Brett in his dissent, state courts
electing to deny credit for 'time served under an invalid sentence
against remaining consecutive sentences, have opted to overlook exist-
ing federal authority which at least partially supports 'the claim for
credit. As determined by the Supreme Court in Blitz v. United States,"0
where the prisoner is serving consecutive sentences imposed under a
multiple count indictment and the first sentence is invalidated, time
served under that first sentence is to be -applied to the remaining sen-
tences. In Blitz it was determined that the 'term of the valid remaining
sentence commenced on the date of imprisonment under the voided
judgment and sentence. Other federal courts dealing wyith the issue
presented in Blitz have followed 'the Supreme Court's reasoning and
judgment closely.' Although these decisions concern themselves with
credit for consecutive sentences only under multiple count indictments,
it is readily apparent that they provide persuasive authority for peti-
tioner's plea for credit in Anderson. It is a short, but desperately
needed, step from the application of credit to consecutive sentences
under multiple count indictments to the application of such credit for
time served under a reversed judgment against remaining consecutive
sentences imposed at the same time for unrelated offenses.
The appeal for credit to be applied against remaining sentences
has not been limited to the small number of articles concerned with
this topic. The American Bar Association, in its Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice, has suggested as an alternative that
such credit be given for all time served.
If a defendant is serving multiple sentences and if one of the
sentences is set aside as the result of direct or collateral at-
tack, credit against the maximum term and any minimum
term of the remaining sentences should be given for all time
served since the commission of the offenses on which the
sentences were based."2
An application of this proposal by state courts could provide maximum
10. 153 U.S. 308 (1893).
11. Jenkins v. United States, 389 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1968); Hoffman v. United
States, 244 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1957); Eckberg v. United States, 167 F.2d 380 (1st
Cir. 1948); Youst v. United States, 151 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1945); Costner v. United
States, 139 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1943); McNealy v. Johnston, 100 F.2d 280 (9th Cir.
1938).
12. A.B.A. PROJECT ON Mnqm-uM STANDARDS FoR CRmNAIL JusTCE--Ap-
PROVED DRAF.-STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PRO-
cvnnmFs, § 3.6(c) (1968).
1974]
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credit for time served under an invalid judgment or sentence. It would
eliminate the tragedy of years of lost time in prison under such a judg-
ment; years of lost freedom due to judicial mistake.
There is another theory on this issue that lends strength to the
plea for credit for time served. The Massachusetts Supreme Court
in its landmark decision in Brown v. Commissioner,3 faced a situa-
tion in which petitioner had received consecutive sentences under one
set of indictments and four months later was convicted under a second
set of indictments with the subsequent sentence to commence after
expiration of -the first set of sentences. The first set of judgments
and sentences were eventually overruled, and the Massachusetts
Court utilized a judicial fairness approach in determining that -the sub-
sequent sentences, under the second indictments, would therefore run
from the date of their imposition rather than from the date of reversal.
Petitioner was to receive credit against the remaining sentences for
all time served since the imposition of the second sentences. The
court stressed the petitioner's rights, "for otherwise a defendant will
have served time for which he receives no credit.' 1 4  This rationale
of the Brown approach has had its effect among other concurring state
jurisdictions. 5 The import of this decision on the right to credit time
of confinement against -later sentences cannot be denied. This far
more humanitarian approach stresses concepts of fairness and equity,
rather than strict adherence to the rigid principle 'that years of confine-
ment designated under one judgment and sentence are only applicable
to that judgment and sentence.
The Brown doctrine had the potential to have a substantial impact
upon the petitioner's appeal for credit in Anderson, due to the fact
that petitioner's valid conviction was imposed on the same day as the
invalid one. Under this doctrine, petitioner would have been granted
the requested six years credit. Unfortunately, the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals has dealt with situations in which this doctrine
could be employed in widely divergent ways. In Lamb v. Page,16 the
court was presented with a fact situation that paralleled the later An-
derson case. In Lamb, petitioner, while serving a suspended sentence
13. 336 Mass. 718, 147 N.E.2d 782 (1958).
14. Id. at 784.
15. Helton v. Mayo, 153 Fla. 616, 15 So. 2d 416 (1943); Bennett v. Hollowell,
203 Iowa 352, 212 N.W. 701 (1927); Potter v. State, 263 N.C. 114, 139 S.E.2d 4
(1964); Commonwealth ex reL Nagle v. Smith, 154 Pa. Super. 392, 36 A.2d 175
(Super. Ct. 1944); Green v. State, 245 A.2d 147 (Me. 1968).
16. 482 P.2d 615 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
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from an earlier conviction, committed a second crime. The suspen-
sion was revoked and Lamb was imprisoned and subsequently con-
victed of the second crime. Nine years later petitioner sought to have
the first conviction declared void. The validity of the first conviction
was the only issue before the court; however, after voiding the first
conviction, the court then concluded, almost as an afterthought, that
time served under the void sentence would be applied to the subse-
quently imposed sentence which petitioner was then serving.
In the later case of Martin v. Page,17 the same court interpreted
the Lamb decision to be a matter of fairness in that particular situation.
In Martin the court adamantly refused to extend the Lamb decision
so as to permit the petitioner to credit time served under a void sen-
tence prior to -the imposition of a valid sentence to ,the term of the
valid sentence. But yet both the state and the court agreed that the
petitioner should receive full credit for all time served under the void
sentence after the imposition of the valid judgment and sentence.' 8
To all appearances the Oklahoma court had accepted the philosophies
of the Brown decision.
If the court had adhered -to the concepts that it had followed in
Lamb and Martin in the later Anderson case, the petitioner would
have received credit for the time served under the invalid conviction
and sentence. But in Anderson the court determined that the Lamb
decision was to be limited to 'the facts of that particular case and was
not to be construed to change Oklahoma law. Martin, with its reli-
ance on the Brown doctrine, went unoited. The fairness approach,
prescribed by the Brown doctrine and utilized to explain the Lamb-
decision, went unmentioned in Anderson. Apparently, concepts of
fairness were of little benefit to -the petitioner in his futile attempt to
gain credit for lost time. Oklahoma law, as interpreted by the court,
was to remain steadfast in its refusal to grant credit.
The constitutional considerations concerning the application of
the principles of Brown have been dealt with in the federal courts.
On this level the trend has evolved -to grant credit for prison time in
situations comparable to -the one found in Brown. 9  Credit was
17. 484 P.2d 1319 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
18. Id. at 1321.
19. Goodwin v. Page, 418 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1969) (in which the appellate court
overruled the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals and held that credit must be granted
due to constitutional reasons). See also, United States ex rel. Olden v. Rundle, 279 F.
Supp. 153 (E.D. Pa. 1968); United States ex reL McKee v. Maroney, 264 F. Supp. 684
(M.D. P4. 1967); Barrow v, N, Car., 251 F, Supp. 612 (E.D.N.C. 1965),
1974]
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deemed essential to ease the judicial conscience and meet the stand-
ards of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 In
essence, these federal courts have concerned themselves with what is
fair and just in determining how to cope with the tragic problem of
the unwarranted service of time in prison. One can only hope that,
in -the future, Oklahoma, and other state courts that have refused to
credit time served under an invalid judgment and sentence to remain-
ing sentences, will themselves adhere to these interpretations of the
requirements of 'the fourteenth amendment and the concurrent stand-
ards of fairness and conscience. It will only be through such a change
of heart and attitude, that future decisions denying credit for lost time
can be avoided.
Through the scope of this article, philosophies both for and
against credit for time spent in prison under an invalid sentence have
been analyzed. Clearly in the eyes of -this -author, those arguments
favoring credit possess the greater legal and moral weight. At this
point it must be emphasized that this article does not appeal for credit
for dead time served under a void sentence when the prisoner has
been released -and has subsequently committed and been convicted of
an entirely different offense. Credit in this situation would permit
the prisoner to "bank" time and commit later offenses with the knowl-
edge that there existed a period of free time to be applied to any sen-
tence. This article presents the limited thesis that, as a matter of ju-
dicial fairness, a prisoner presently incarcerated under consecutive
sentences for differing offenses should be permitted to credit time
served under an invalid sentence toward the remaining valid sen-
tences. It will only be when all jurisdictions accept these concepts
of fairness that the tragedy of lost years in prison, as found in Ander-
son, can be permanently erased.
20. Goodwin v. Page, 418 F.2d 867 at 868 (10th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel.
McKee v. Maroney, 264 F. Supp. 684 at 688 (M.D. Pa. 1967).
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